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Programming Errors: Understanding the
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a
Program, Not an Incident
Tracey L. Mearest
This Essay takes seriously the relevance of law enforcement effectiveness and
the role of empiricism in understandingthe constitutionalityof the police practices
at issue in the Floyd case and urban police practicesmore generally; it also recasts
the debate a bit. A critical but obscured issue is the mismatch between the level of
analysis at which the Supreme Court articulatedthe relevant test for constitutional justification of a stop-and-frisk in Terry v Ohio and the scale at which police
today (and historically) engage in stop-and-frisk as a practice. To put this more
succinctly, while the Court in Terry authorizedpolice intervention in an individual
incident-when the police officer possesses probable cause to believe that an armed
individual is involved in a crime-in reality, stop-and-frisk typically is carriedout
by a police force en masse as a program.Although the constitutionalframework is
based on a one-off investigative incident, many of those who are stopped-the majority of them young men of color-do not experience the stops as one-off incidents.
They experience them as a program to police them as a group, which is, of course,
the reality. That is exactly what police agencies are doing. Fourth Amendment reasonableness must take this fact into account. I make an argument here about how
we should approachthis issue.

INTRODUCTION

For just under a decade, the NYPD engaged in a deliberate
program of stopping and frisking individuals throughout the
city, concentrated in certain areas, for the stated purpose of
suppressing crime. Throughout this period of aggressive policing, the number of police stops increased from 160,851 in 2003
to a peak of 685,724 in 2011.1 The program came to a screeching
t Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I am grateful to David
Sklansky, Ben Justice, James Forman, Bennett Capers, Miriam Gohara, Jeff Fagan, Issa
Kohler-Hausmann, Tom Tyler, and participants at the 2014 University of Chicago Law
Review Symposium for comments on an earlier draft. Matt Specht provided research assistance. All errors are my own.
1 Stop-and-Frisk Data (New York Civil Liberties Union, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z5XK-FXFR. Note that these counts are of stops, not of particular individuals stopped. Analysis indicates that some New Yorkers necessarily were stopped
multiple times in a year. See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, PhD, Floyd v City of New York, 08
Civ 01034 (SAS), *22 (SDNY filed Oct 15, 2010) ("Fagan Report") (indicating that, of the
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halt on August 12, 2013, when Judge Shira Scheindlin issued a
ruling in Floyd v City of New York,2 holding that the NYPD had
engaged in a practice of unconstitutional stops and frisks. 3 By
the end of 2013, the NYPD posted fewer than 200,000 stops,
down from more than half a million the year prior. 4 Between
2011 and 2013, New York City's homicide count declined by 35
5
percent.
The relationship between the NYPD's program and the
city's astonishing decline in crime was a focal point in the national debate about the Stop, Question, and Frisk (SQF) strategy, even though as a legal matter the issue remained on the
sidelines.6 The NYPD and former New York City mayor Michael
Bloomberg claimed that SQF was a good policy choice because it
7
reduced violent crime by deterring people from carrying guns.
The Floyd plaintiffs alleged that the stops and frisks were part
of a policy and practice that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the US Constitution.8 Those supporting the defendants responded that the stops were consistent with the law
and that the high number of stops and frisks-especially those
in the city's higher-crime areas-kept crime low, largely benefitting the very people who were complaining. 9
This back and forth raises a question: Is there a way to understand the relevance of SQF's effectiveness to the policy's constitutionality? Some argue that taking this question seriously
would result in the flagrant disregard of individual rights. Suppose that the law promoted a thoroughgoing commitment to ensuring effective criminal-law enforcement no matter the constitutional constraint by disengaging the exclusionary rule in every
people stopped between 2004 and 2009, 89 percent were male, 49 percent were under the
age of 25, and 52 percent were African American).
2
959 F Supp 2d 540 (SDNY 2013).
3
Id at 562. Scheindlin held that the NYPD program violated thousands of individuals' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. Id.
4
See Joe Coscarelli, Stop-and-Frisk Problem 'More or Less Solved,' Says Bratton
(NY Magazine, Jan 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5SSC-XA6D.
5
See generally Index Crimes Reported to Police by Region: 2004-2013 (New York
State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Nov 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
K9KD-EP29.
6
See text accompanying notes 17, 36-37.
7
See generally mikebloomberg, Mike Bloomberg Delivers Address on Public Safety
to NYPD Leadership (Apr 30, 2013), online
at https://www.youtube.coml
watch?v=vi98AfymlYO (visited Nov 15, 2014).
8 Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 556.
9 See Barry Paddock, Kelly: Stop-and-Frisk Saves Lives by Taking Guns off the
Street (NY Daily News, Apr 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/Q2J4-YRZR.
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case in which there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. The likely result would be the erosion of constitutional rights even if law enforcement effectiveness would increase at the individual level.1o Erosion of rights is obviously a
bad outcome. Yet it is also true that the Fourth Amendment in
particular calls for a reasonable balance between liberty and order, seemingly an explicit invitation to consider law enforcement
effectiveness." An assessment of this balancing of effectiveness
invites an empirical approach to determining the scope of constitutional law in this area. 2
Empiricism was star of the show in Floyd in the sense that
the case was largely driven by big data. The NYPD's ability to
track its productivity by looking to the forms that officers used
to document their stops (called UF-250s) was the foundation of
its claim that more stops meant less crime. 13 The UF-250s were
critical to the plaintiffs' case as well.14 Through close analysis of
the forms that the NYPD used to track stops, the Center for
Constitutional Rights ("the Center") was able to show that a
critical percentage of the stops did not meet Fourth Amendment
standards, even though the majority of the stops did. 15 Moreover,
the Center used the same data to construct its argument that

10 See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 657-60 (1961) (adopting the exclusionary rule and
explaining that "[t]he ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest"). But see Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule,
1999 U Ill L Rev 363, 368-90 (explaining through behavioral and motivational theory
why the exclusionary rule is a structurally flawed method to deter individual wrongdoing); Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application
of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 Emory L J 937, 941-44 (1983) (critiquing the exclusionary rule and offering an alternative).
11 See Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: TransparentAdjudication and Social Science Research in ConstitutionalCriminal Procedure, 90 J Crim L &
Crimin 733, 737 (2000), citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of
Balancing, 96 Yale L J 943, 943 (1987).
12 See, for example, Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Crimin at 763 (cited in
note 11) ("There exists research that the Court should have considered and referenced in
its opinion that gives some measure of the effectiveness and costs to law enforcement of
the Mirandawarnings. That research is relevant in deciding whether to continue requiring Miranda procedures. It informs the balancing-of-interests analysis.").
13 See Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 600-01.
14 See id at 559 ("[Pllaintiffs' case was based on the imperfect information contained in the NYPD's database of forms ('UF-250s') that officers are required to prepare
after each stop.").
15 See id at 582-83. See also id at 658 (concluding that the "plaintiffs showed that
practices resulting in unconstitutional [with respect to the Fourth Amendment] stops
and frisks were sufficiently widespread that they had the force of law").
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the NYPD was engaged in a racially discriminatory policy and
practice in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.16
In this Essay I want to take seriously the relevance of law
enforcement effectiveness and the role of empiricism in understanding the constitutionality of the police practices at issue in
Floyd and in urban police practices more generally. I also want
to recast the debate a bit. While the media debate centered on
the relevance of the effectiveness of the NYPD's SQF, with
Scheindlin coming down squarely on the "not relevant" side of
the ledger, 17 this debate obscured a related but, in my view,
more important issue. I believe a more critical issue is the mismatch between the level of analysis at which the Supreme Court
articulated the relevant test for constitutional justification of a
stop-and-frisk in Terry v Ohio i8 and the scale at which police today (and historically) engage in stop-and-frisk as a practice.
That is, while the Court in Terry authorized police intervention
in an individual incident when a police officer possesses less
than probable cause to believe that an armed individual is involved in a crime, in reality stop-and-frisk is more typically carried out by a police force en masse as a program.
At first glance it might seem that the point that I am trying
to make is not as important as I suggest. Is it not the case that a
mass of stops and frisks is simply an aggregation of individual
incidents? The answer, in short, is no. When policing agencies
engage in an organizationally determined practice of stopping
certain "sorts" of people for the stated purpose of preventing or
deterring crime, as the NYPD did, they are engaging in what I
call a "program." The stops that flow from these programs are
not individual incidents that grow organically-endogenouslyout of a collection of individual investigations occurring between
an officer and a person that the officer believes to be committing
a crime. Rather, programmatic stops are imposed from the top
down and are exogenous to the fabric of community-police
See id at 572, 583.
In her Floyd opinion, Scheindlin cabined the relevance of law enforcement effectiveness from her assessment of the constitutional violations in question. When the defendants attempted to present evidence on the effectiveness of SQF in reducing New
York City crime, Scheindlin refused to allow it: "[T]his case is not about the effectiveness
of stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime. This Court's mandate is solely to judge
the constitutionality of police behavior, not its effectiveness as a law enforcement tool.
... 'The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off
the table."' Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 556, quoting District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US
570, 636 (2008).
18 392 US 1 (1968).
16
17
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relations. In Terry, the Court dictated a framework to assess the
constitutionality of police action in the endogenous context, but
proactive policing of crime does not fit that model. Because proactive policing is carried out differently from the one-off intervention into a crime in progress that Terry concerned, those who
are subject to it experience it differently. And it is that reality
that fueled the litigation in Floyd.
In order to illustrate the point, let us recall the facts of Terry itself. Officer Martin McFadden, a thirty-nine-year veteran of
the Cincinnati police force, observed John Terry and two companions walking back and forth on the sidewalk outside a store
for about ten to twelve minutes. 19 McFadden suspected that the
men were "casing a job" in preparation for a robbery, so he also
suspected that they were armed.20 He approached the men, identified himself, and asked for their names. 21 Receiving a mumbled
response, McFadden grabbed Terry, spun him around, and then
patted down his outer clothing.22 McFadden found a pistol inside
Terry's coat pocket.23 The crux of my argument here is that
McFadden was engaged in an investigatory tactic in the context
of what he suspected to be a crime in progress. 24 When his suspicions became sufficiently aroused as he watched the incident unfold over a fairly long period, he intervened. The question that
the Court addressed was whether McFadden's action was justified even though he did not have probable cause to arrest Terry
and his confederates. The Court's answer was yes. 25 McFadden
did not need probable cause in order to justify his stop-and-frisk
of Terry because reasonable suspicion that Terry was armed and
dangerous was constitutionally adequate.26

19 Id at 5-6.
Id at 6.
21
Id at 6-7.
22 Terry, 392 US at 7.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See id at 27-28.
26 Terry, 392 US at 10, 25. In reaching this conclusion, the Court disagreed both
with the petitioner, Terry, who argued that even a limited pat down during a so-called
field interrogation should be treated in the same way as any search, therefore requiring
justification by probable cause, and with the respondent, the State of Ohio, which argued
that a limited pat down was not a search at all and thus presented no Fourth Amendment issue. See Brief for Respondent on Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Ohio,
Terry v State of Ohio, No 67, *16-17 (US filed Nov 3, 1967) (available on Westlaw at
1967 WL 113685).
20
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While the individual, incident-level analysis in Terry may be
suitable (enough) for assessing whether evidence should be introduced in a criminal case should an individual defendant challenge it, I believe that the individual-level analysis is unsuitable
for assessing the nature of violations like those presented in
Floyd. This matters because Floyd lays bare the reality of urban
policing: stop-and-frisk is carried out systematically, deliberately, and with great frequency. If a court had analyzed any one of
the stops carried out as part of the NYPD program, or as part of
a similar program in another city,27 the court likely would have
found that police appear to abide by Terry's strictures most of
the time.28 Further, if that court had analyzed each stop-andfrisk individually, the court might have assumed that, because
police get it right most of the time, it would be a good idea to
give police a great deal of discretion to intervene in criminal incidents that unfold before them in order to keep the public safe.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that most stops likely are constitutional when measured individually under Terry, when a mass
of stops are considered in the aggregate, the data make clear
that police are not investigating people that they suspect to be
committing particular crimes in progress but are instead proactively policing people that they suspect could be offenders.29 The
data show that the "suspects" that police encounter the vast majority of the time do not possess guns or contraband, are never
arrested, and are very rarely processed criminally.30 Yet, because the Fourth Amendment does not allow police to engage a
person and interfere with her rights of privacy and autonomy
unless that officer has reason to believe that she is engaged in
crime, the observing public may assume that those who are
27 For example, 2009 data indicate that the Philadelphia Police Department made
253,333 pedestrian stops. Robert Moran, NY Mayor Takes Shot at Philly over Stop-andFrisk (Philadelphia Inquirer, May 25, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/K885-YEQU.
Given Philadelphia's population, these numbers yield an even higher per capita encounter rate than New York City's. See id.
28 It is critical, of course, to understand that the ability to make this determination
will depend on the account of the justification for the stop that is being reviewed. In
Floyd, the account of what justified the stops came from forms containing boxes supplying predetermined reasons that officers could check off, and there is reason to question
the credibility of those accounts. See Fagan Report at *55 (cited in note 1) (concluding
that at least 68.9 percent of stops, and as many as 93.3 percent, were legally justified).
29 See generally Jeffrey Fagan, Greg Conyers, and Ian Ayres, No Runs, Few Hits
and Many Errors: Street Stops, Bias and Proactive Policing (unpublished conference
draft, 2014) (on file with author) (noting, in an analysis of the New York data, that there
are factors that police officers are more likely to use for blacks than for whites).
30 See Floyd, F Supp 2d at 573-75 (detailing hit rates).
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stopped by police are committing or are about to commit a criminal offense. 31 Although the constitutional framework is based on
a one-off investigative incident, many of those who are
stopped-the majority of them young men of color-do not experience the stops as one-off incidents. Young men of color experience the stops as a program to police them as a group, which is,
of course, the reality.3, Fourth Amendment reasonableness must
33
account for this fact.

I. SYSTEMATIC STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK
It is important to understand why the NYPD engaged in a
strategy of making several hundred thousand stops yearly for
almost a decade starting in the early 2000s. It seems almost unimaginable now, but in 1990 the homicide rate for New York
City was 30.7 per 100,000.34 The sharp decline in crime had certainly already begun by the mid-1990s when William Bratton,
the NYPD's celebrated commissioner, reinvented the department as a leader in innovative policing strategies such as
COMPSTAT and order-maintenance policing.36 Bratton, and later, Commissioner Raymond Kelly, brought an aggressive policing style to the city, and SQF was the engine.36 The NYPD
31 See Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence,96 Colum L Rev 1456, 1524-25 (1996) (discussing the role of public perception of the guilty in the Fourth Amendment context generally).
32 See Carmen Solis, Edwardo L. Portillos, and Rod K. Brunson, Latino Youths'Experiences with and Perceptionsof Involuntary Police Encounters, 623 Annals Am Acad
Polit & Soc Sci 39, 47 (2009):
Many of us ...are afraid of the police because even when we are citizens and
many of us go through so much to get citizenship, the police just continue to
stop us and not respect us and so many people end up in jail ....It's like what
we worked so hard for is second class citizenship.
33 See Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 St
John's L Rev 1097, 1123-24 (1998) (noting that "issues of race.., should be addressed in
a comprehensive framework of constitutional reasonableness"). See also Terry, 392 US at
17 n 14 ("[T]he degree of community resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations
of personal security.").
34 Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That
Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J Econ Persp 163, 168 (2004). Washington,
DC, just a year later, posted a homicide rate-certainly unimaginable today--of 80.6 per
100,000. Id.
35 See Michael D. White, The New York City Police Department,Its Crime Control
Strategies and OrganizationalChanges, 1970-2009, 31 Just Q 74, 80-83 (2014).
36 The policing style is sometimes referred to as "broken windows" following James
Q. Wilson and George Kelling's celebrated Atlantic Monthly article of the same name.
See generally James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, Atlantic
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argued that its SQF strategy was a good policy choice in that it
effectively deterred violent crime by deterring people from carrying guns. 37 It turns out that this argument has a decades-long
history that precedes even Terry.
As Professor David Sklansky notes, the 1950s saw the rise
of the "second wave" of police professionalism, rooted in "good
government managerialism."38 In cities across the country, local
governments turned to ideas of professionalism, and at least
some officials used police professionalism to disentangle urban
policing agencies from graft politics. 39 The theory driving this
wave of professionalism was supplied by an earlier generation of
criminal justice theorists including Professor August Vollmer.40
Vollmer's student, professor and policing-professionalism advocate O.W. Wilson, started to emphasize a concrete but limited
role for police agencies. Wilson and his followers believed that
policing agencies could do little about the root causes of crime,
such as poverty and mental illness. But Wilson argued that police could deter criminal activity by increasing the likelihood
that offenders would be caught or by reducing the opportunities
for offenders to commit crime.41 A key plank of the professionalization agenda arose from these ideas. Police should seek out offenders rather than wait for victims to report crime. They should
engage in "systematic,42 preventive (rather than responsive)
patrol.43
Monthly 29 (Mar 1982). As Professor Jeffrey Bellin makes clear, aggressive SQF does not
really fit the broken-windows theory. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship between the Constitutionalityand Effectiveness of New York City "Stop and Frisk",94 BU L
Rev 1495, 1503-08 (2014).
37 See Bellin, 94 BU L Rev at 1515 (cited in note 36).
38 David Alan Sklansky, Democracy and the Police 35-36 (Stanford 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
39 See Christopher Lowen Agee, The Streets of San Francisco:Policing and the Creation of a Cosmopolitan Liberal Politics,1950-1972 32 (Chicago 2014).
40 See O.W. Wilson, August Vollmer, 44 J Crim L & Crimin 91, 101 (1953).
41 See OW. Wilson and Roy Clinton McLaren, Police Administration 320-21
(McGraw-Hill 4th ed 1977). This text explains that patrol has four purposes: to repress
crime by reducing the opportunity for it; to prevent crime by engaging with potential
offenders and redirecting them to more positive behaviors; to investigate potential
crimes; and, finally, to be available for noncriminal services such as resolving family arguments. See id. The situation presented in Terry fits in the third category, while most
SQF falls more easily into the first two categories.
42 Id at 347:
Another fundamental technique is the systematic use of field interrogation. Patrol officers should talk to as many people as possible during routine patrol activities, and in particular they should contact as many potential offenders as
they can. In situations in which "stop and frisk" action would be permissible,
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Thomas Cahill, the longest-serving police chief in San Francisco's history, took seriously this principle of professional policing. Cahill believed that preventing crime was more important
than clearing cases. "[C]learing a case," he said, "will not bring
back the victim." 44 Accordingly, in the 1950s, a full decade before
Terry was decided, Cahill launched "Operation S" on the streets
of San Francisco. "S" stood for saturation, and the program
called for flooding San Francisco's high crime areas with roughly
fifty officers who stopped, questioned, frisked, and arrested on
vagrancy charges suspicious characters who police believed were
about to break the law. 4 5 In situations that did not result in arrest, police were instructed to fill out identification cards, which
the San Francisco Chroniclelater approvingly reported could be
46
used to generate suspect lists for crimes occurring in the area.
The number of stops that Operation S generated was prodigious
for the times. Historian Robert Fogelson reported that, in its
first year, Operation S tallied twenty thousand stops, most of
which were of young black men. 47 Does this program sound
familiar?
By the time that the late Professors James Q. Wilson and
Barbara Boland wrote The Effect of the Police on Crime in 1978,
post-Terry, they were not writing on a blank slate. 4s Based on an
analysis of the robbery rates of thirty-five cities, Wilson and
Boland urged police to shift from random police patrol to a more
aggressive and "legalistic" style of policing aimed at maximizing
the number of interactions with and observations of a relevant
community. 49 The authors' analysis included data consistent
with the argument that cities with high levels of traffic citations

officers should obtain information from persons which can be filed for future
reference.
Agee, The Streets of San Franciscoat 35-36 (cited in note 39).
Hearings before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 86th Cong, 2d
Sess 758 (1960).
45 See Agee, The Streets of San Francisco at 36 (cited in note 39); Robert M. Fogelson, Big-City Police 187 (Harvard 1977).
46 See Agee, The Streets of San Franciscoat 36 (cited in note 39).
47 Fogelson, Big-City Police at 187-88 (cited in note 45).
48
See generally James Q. Wilson and Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on
Crime, 12 L & Society Rev 367 (1978). This was one of the earliest scholarly articles to
call for a strategy of stop-and-frisk to address violent crimes in cities. Interestingly, nowhere in their piece do the authors refer to their intellectual predecessor, O.W. Wilson,
nor do they note Cahill's role in San Francisco.
49 Id at 371, 383, 385 (describing a policing style heavily reliant on traffic stops and
street stops as aggressive and legalistic patrol).
43
44
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had fewer robberies than those with low levels.[ 0 A few cities followed their recommendation, but the approach did not achieve
real national penetration until Professor Lawrence Sherman's
"The Kansas City Gun Experiment" seemed to confirm James Q.
Wilson's hypothesis.51
Focusing on one police beat in Kansas City, Sherman and
his research team conducted a quasi experiment for twenty-nine
weeks in which beat officers attempted three strategiesincluding field interrogation-designed to increase gun seizures
for the purpose of reducing violent crime. 52 At the experiment's
end, total gun seizures were up by 65 percent, and the number
of guns found in car checks was triple the number seized prior to
the experiment's commencement in the same area. 53 Additionally, the rate of guns seized in the experimental district was much
54
higher than the rate of seizure in the matched control district.
Gun crime went down precipitously in the treatment districtdeclining by 49 percent-while there was almost no change in
the control district. 5 Additionally, Sherman and his coauthors
found little evidence of crime displacement away from the area
of intensive treatment. 56 Scores of cities rushed to follow the
Kansas City model, including, perhaps most famously, New
York City.57
It is critical to understand that the strategy that James Q.
Wilson and Boland envisioned-and the strategy that was actually carried out in Kansas City-is a program. In other words,
stop-and-frisk under this approach is not simply a tool on the
officer's belt to be used when the situation is right, such as intervening in a crime in progress, which was the factual scenario
presented in Terry. Rather, good policing is articulated from the
top down throughout the entire agency to include aggressive,

50 See id at 375-76.
51 See Lawrence W. Sherman and Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun
Violence: "Hot Spots"Patrol in Kansas City, 12 Just Q 673, 675-76 (1995). It is also likely that Wilson's own later, popular work on the topic stoked the fire. See, for example,
James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, NY Times Magazine 46 (Mar 20, 1994).
52 Sherman and Rogan, 12 Just Q at 677-78 (cited in note 51).
53 Id at 683-84.
54 Id.
55 Id at 685.
56 Sherman and Rogan, 12 Just Q at 686-87 (cited in note 51).
57 See Lawrence W. Sherman, In Remembrance: James Wilford Shaw,
Criminologist, 20 Criminologist 23, 23 (1995) ("A conservative estimate is that over 100
other police agencies adopted a similar program because of Dr. James Shaw's careful
work in Kansas City.").
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systematic, "legalistic" field interrogations designed to suppress
crime.5 There is a distinct consequence of this approach. In the
program context, police on patrol looking to prevent crime do not
seek out particular crimes in progress. Instead, they engage in
assessments of suspicious characteristics-clothes that are out
of season, suspicious bulges in clothing, furtive movements, age,
gender, and so on. 59 Ideally, an officer will keep an eye on the
person who exhibits enough suspicious characteristics and wait
until that person engages in some kind of activity that justifies
the officer's interference. Less ideally, the officer will act simply
on the basis of suspicious characteristics, making an assumption
that anyone who looks a certain way is someone who could be a
person about to engage in crime.60 This logical leap comes very
close to the constitutional line; Terry and its progeny are quite
clear that an officer must be "specific" and "reasonable" in inferring that criminal activity is actually "afoot;" an "inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch' will not suffice.61 Of
course, when police engage in this kind of policing it is inevitable-at least without randomization-that certain groups will
have more contact with police than will other groups. 62 James Q.
Wilson himself acknowledged the antagonistic potential of his
strategy in a journalistic version of his argument, called Just
Take Away Their Guns. He wrote there, 'Young black and
Hispanic men will probably be stopped more often than older
white Anglo males or women of any race."63

58 Wilson and Boland, 12 L & Society Rev at 370 (cited in note 48).
59 See Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment, 78 U Chi L Rev 809, 818-21 (2011).
60 Professor David Harris has made a similar observation, noting that courts over
time have held constitutional stops based on categorical judgments on the part of police
rather than particularized suspicion. See David A. Harris, ParticularizedSuspicion,
Categorical Judgements: Supreme Court Rhetoric versus Lower Court Reality under
Terry v. Ohio, 72 St John's L Rev 975, 987-1012 (1998). My argument here is that programmatic stop-and-frisk drives categorical judgments. There is, of course, a feedback
loop between court judgments and programmatic stop-and-frisk. When courts endorse
particular factors as legitimate for officers to consider in an individual case, those factors
are folded into a policy and can then be pushed down from the top as factors for officers
to consider when carrying out the program. Thus, "high crime areas" and "furtive movements" have become factors justifying reasonable suspicion.
61 Terry, 392 US at 27, 30.
62 See Harcourt and Meares, 78 U Chi L Rev at 815 (cited in note 59) ("The only
way to [search within the group] without injecting bias and prejudice is to randomly
search the group, because randomization allows us to select from the group while avoiding illegitimate criteria to discriminate within the group.").
63 Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, NY Times Magazine at 46 (cited in note 51).
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II. MEASURING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROGRAM
Judge Scheindlin noted "the inherent difficulty in making
findings and conclusions regarding 4.4 million stops."64 It was
practically impossible to analyze each stop individually according to the Terry standard.65 Instead, the plaintiffs' case relied on
the information about each stop documented in a form-the UF250-that NYPD officers were required to fill out after each
stop.66 Despite obvious validity problems with analyzing the
forms, Scheindlin relied on the estimate provided by the
plaintiffs' expert witness, Professor Jeffrey Fagan, that at least
6.7 percent-and perhaps as many as 31.1 percent-of the stops
were made without reasonable suspicion.67 This means that 93.3
percent of the stops (a liberal estimate, to be sure) could be considered constitutional. Is that good enough to justify the practice? Is it good enough if the approach is reducing crime? Does it
matter whether the approach is really effective or just barely effective? Can we even ask these questions?
It probably matters whether we ask these questions in the
context of the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. In the context of the Fourth Amendment, crime control is
obviously relevant because the Amendment authorizes police action in the first place. There should be a close connection between stops and frisks and crime, given that the point of stops
and frisks either at the incident or program level is to intervene
in or to prevent crime. The job of officers is to act when they acquire enough information to believe that crime is afoot. In the
context of the Fourteenth Amendment, the potential relevance of
effectiveness at crime reduction is more complicated, because
the question is not whether the state has a good reason to act,
but instead whether the enforcement that the state has engaged
in, whether justified under the Fourth Amendment or not, is
based on race. If a court finds that the state has made an
Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 559.
See id.
66 See id. Two problems should be immediately obvious. First, it is not clear that
officers necessarily filled out a form every time that they stopped someone, so the forms
likely undercount the number of stops. Second, there is a basic credibility problem: How
does one know whether the reasons that an officer checks off on the forms constitute the
real reasons that he or she stopped and possibly frisked a suspect? See Fagan Report at
*55 (cited in note 1).
67 Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 582. See also generally Jeffrey Fagan and Amanda
Geller, Following the Script: Narrativesof Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82
U Chi L Rev 51 (2015).
64
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impermissible racial classification, the burden shifts to the state
to show that its practice is narrowly tailored and serves a compelling interest. In theory, the city could make an argument that
crime reduction is such an interest.
The city did not provide a legal argument as to the relevance of effectiveness because Scheindlin would not allow it, but
one can engage in a thought experiment regarding the kind of
evidence that the city might have presented with respect to the
Fourth Amendment question. Recall that the genesis of the New
York strategy and its progeny can be traced to James Q. Wilson
and Boland's 1978 Law and Society article advocating proactive
and aggressive police activity-"legalistic" policing-that focuses
on issuing many citations and questioning disorderly people at
high rates in order to reduce the overall crime rate.68 It may
come as a surprise that the idea was a bold one at the time: police could actually reduce crime. Although O.W. Wilson and others had made police effectiveness at crime reduction a central
plank of police professionalism, there was little empirical evidence at the time that police could actually achieve this goal.69
By the late 1970s, most police scholars had given up the ghost
on this point. 70 James Q. Wilson and Boland were still in the
fight, however. They hypothesized that the aggressive-patrol
approach could work for two reasons. First, aggressive policing
could affect crime rates indirectly by increasing the incidence of
weapons detection2 1 Second, stops and frisks could impact crime
directly by changing potential offenders' perceptions about their
risk of apprehension, as the activity is a visible indicator of police presence. 72 Wilson and Boland's claim was that the effect of
aggressive patrol could occur even if the practice did not lead to
a higher rate of solved crimes. If they were right, then police
alone could make a difference in crime, rather than merely being
See text accompanying notes 48-50.
The conventional wisdom at the time was that police had no impact on crime
whatsoever. See, for example, David H. Bayley, Police for the Future 9 (Oxford 1994):
68

69

The plain fact is that police actions cannot be shown to reduce the amount of
crime. ... The damning conclusion that the police are not preventing crime
rests entirely on a large body of research undertaken for the most part during
the 1970s. Try as they might, researchers were unable, often at considerable
cost, to show that the number of police, the amount of money spent on police, or
the methods police use had any effect on crime. This is still the consensus
among experts.
70 See id.
71 See Wilson and Boland, 12 L & Society Rev at 373 (cited in note 48).
72 See id at 373-74.
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conduits to prosecution. Under this theory, more stops means
73

less crime.

One basic problem with the NYPD's reliance on effectiveness to support the constitutionality of its policy is, as I noted
above, the fact that two provisions of the Constitution were relevant in the litigation, not one. The Floyd plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments. The
Fourth Amendment requires that police possess the requisite
amount of information about a suspect before interfering with
her privacy and autonomy. Terry and its progeny specify that
level of information as reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot (to justify a stop) and reasonable suspicion that a
person is armed and dangerous (to justify a frisk). The Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, is concerned with state decisionmaking that produces racially disparate impacts when such
decisions are made with discriminatory purpose.
Scheindlin's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment liability
findings are importantly intertwined, because racial disproportion in stops and frisks alone does not provide a foundation for a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. 74 Terry teaches that police

73 Since 1978, there have been additional studies on this topic. In a replication and
theoretical extension of Wilson and Boland's work ten years later, Professors Robert
Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen found that proactive policing had a direct inverse effect
on robbery rates in over 170 American cities in 1980, holding constant important correlates of crime such as poverty, inequality, and family disruption. See Robert J. Sampson
and Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime:A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L & Society Rev 163, 176-77 (1988). The authors cautioned, however, that "restrictions on freedom entailed by an aggressive policing policy also are an important concern." Id at 186. The latest and best study attempting to find a connection
between stops and crime shows few significant effects of different SQF measures (rate of
total stops; stops of black, Hispanic, and white suspects; and stops resulting in arrest) on
precinct robbery and burglary rates (the rates mostly likely to reveal an impact). See
Richard Rosenfeld and Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery
and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 31 Just Q 96, 116 (2014). The study's
authors do not conclude that SQF had no impact on crime, but they note that "if there is
an impact, it is so localized and dissipates so rapidly that it fails to register in annual
precinct crime rates, much less the decade-long citywide crime reductions that public
officials have attributed to the policy." Id at 117-18. I caution that, despite the fact that
this study may be the best analysis of the relationship between stops and the crime decline in New York City, it too suffers from problems of validity. For a summary of the
research on effectiveness of SQF, see generally Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social
Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 335 (2014).
74
For an argument regarding the Fourth Amendment's failure to regulate conduct
such as that presented in Floyd and offering a Fourteenth Amendment solution, see generally Brando Simeo Starkey, A Failureof the Fourth Amendment & Equal Protection's
Promise:How the Equal Protection Clause Can Change Discriminatory Stop and Frisk
Policies, 18 Mich J Race & L 131 (2012) (arguing that courts' interpretation of the Fourth
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must show reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot or has occurred before stopping someone. Therefore, one would expect
that more stops and frisks would occur in high crime areas when
those stops are being carried out in a manner that comports
with the Fourth Amendment. Because the demographics of New
York City are such that the higher-crime areas contain a higher
proportion of African American and Hispanic residents, one
would expect, all else equal, that police would stop people of color disproportionately to their representation in the city's population if they chose, as Fourth Amendment doctrine seems to direct, to focus on so-called high crime areas. 75 That is, legal
policing of the streets of New York most likely would burden
African Americans more than other groups because of the connection between race, place, and crime.76
Professor Fagan's analysis of millions of NYPD UF-250
forms casts doubt on the conclusion that the NYPD's actions
were obviously legal, however. In his expert report, Fagan shows
that the racial composition of a neighborhood is a statistically
significant predictor of the number of police stops even when
controlling for police-reported measures of crime, police-patrol

Amendment, which allows categorical exceptions based on the type of crime that is suspected, prevents constraints on stop-and-frisk practices, but that a "Plaintiff-Burdened
Deliberate Indifference" standard under the Fourteenth Amendment can present a
strong argument against SQF policies). In this Essay, my focus is on the Fourth
Amendment, not the Fourteenth.
75 Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124-25 (2000) (stating that a location's character as a "high crime area" is relevant to determining whether there is reasonable suspicion). It is important to note that the doctrine on this point is hardly clear. The Supreme
Court in Wardlow did not specify a test (and has not since) for assessing just how high
the level of crime in a particular place must be to justify a finding of reasonable suspicion, so the lower courts have developed their own (not entirely consistent) approaches to
the problem. See, for example, United States v Wright, 485 F3d 45, 53-54 (1st Cir 2007)
(setting out a three-factor test for what constitutes a "high crime area," requiring a
nexus between the crime suspected in the case and the crime most prevalent in the area,
limited geographical boundaries, and "temporal proximity between evidence of heightened criminal activity and the date of the stop"). See also United States v Patton, 705
F3d 734, 738-41 (7th Cir 2013); United States v Caruthers, 458 F3d 459, 467-68 (6th Cir
2006). But most courts rarely require law enforcement agents to provide objective, verifiable, or empirical data to back up their claims, allowing the state to rely simply on local
media reports. Scholars have challenged the term "high crime area" as leading to race- or
class-based discrimination. See, for example, David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable
Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind L J 659, 679-81
(1994); Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 U Fla
L Rev 391, 400-04 (2003).
76 See Robert J. Sampson, Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring
Neighborhood Effect 248-51 (Chicago 2012). See also Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime,
73 Chi Kent L Rev 669, 673-76 (1998).
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allocations, and other social conditions in that neighborhood. 77
Fagan's regressions test for whether crime rates explain the
NYPD's stop practices after controlling for population size and
race of the relevant area's population, net of other factors such
as poverty, education level, and the like. If police were attempting to address crime through stop activity, one would expect the
level of stops to increase in tandem with crime in any given
area, net of other factors. This relationship is clearly what the
Terry standard directs. However, Fagan's findings consistently
reveal that the racial composition of an area predicted stop patterns over and above the contribution made by crime. 78 In fact,
the level of violent crime in an area, somewhat surprisingly, did
not make any contribution to explaining the level of stops in
high crime areas. Thus, while the NYPD claimed to engage in a
strategy to deter gun crimes by deploying officers to places exhibiting the highest crime rates, statistical analysis indicates
that the department blanketed certain neighborhoods with patrol officers and directed those officers to "stop the right people,"
justifying this policy choice with self-perpetuating statistics indicating that large percentages of New Yorkers arrested for gun
crimes were black or Hispanic. 79 The policy amounted to stopping large numbers of people of color "in general" for the purpose
of preventing crime-in express contravention of Terry's specific
teachings that each and every individual stop must be based on
specific, articulable facts indicative of criminal activity.80
III. THE MISMATCH
The Floyd decision is importantly driven by data, which
both sides could use to illustrate the potential public benefits of
SQF-crime reduction-as well as the costs to the public in the
form of massive numbers of unjustified police encounters. The
typical stop-and-frisk case is not data driven. In the typical case,
a court, in order to determine whether a police officer complied
with the Fourth Amendment, will listen to the officer tell the
story of an individual incident and then assess retrospectively
whether that officer had enough information to disturb the target's privacy and autonomy. While one might think that this approach makes sense in individual criminal cases (in the
77
78
79

80

See Fagan Report at *30-33 (cited in note 1).
See id at *35-39.
Floyd, 959 F Supp 2d at 667 & n 782.
Id at 664 (emphasis omitted).
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extremely rare case in which a stop results in a prosecution),
which constitute over 90 percent of Terry claims,81 the reality of
urban policing clearly overwhelms the structure of the rule.
Monitoring stops individually through the exclusionary rule attempts to shape policing policy after the fact by addressing decisions of individual officers, rather than those at the management level, where programmatic policing is dictated. This means
that a problematic policy that drives a small, but critically important, percentage of stops is unlikely to ever be changed. One
hopes that managers are enlightened enough to change these
policies on their own without litigation, but clearly litigation like
Floyd can help. The litigation makes an important contribution
by matching, through the innovative use of data, the level of
constitutional analysis to the scale of the program. This kind of
analysis can highlight the good-apparently officers usually
comply with the Constitution-and the bad: in a significant percentage of cases, police do not comply with the Constitution, and
when they do not, the burden falls disproportionately on racial
minorities. Considering stops as a program reveals something
else. Justification of decisionmaking is not the only game in
town. The scale of the program matters whether the stops are
justified or not. And so does the racial composition of stops, even
when they are justified under the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that racial minorities in cities disproportionately
encounter police in both constitutional and unconstitutional contexts fuels those minorities' perceptions of the illegitimacy of the
police.82 Qualitative research is especially helpful to illustrate
this point. Professors Jacinta Gau and Rod Brunson interviewed
St. Louis youth in an attempt to uncover their relationship with
81 Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 BU L Rev 405, 422, 425 (2012). In a study of the
approximately 1,300 published federal appellate decisions between 2005 and 2009 that
discuss a Fourth Amendment issue, Professor Nancy Leong found that 95 percent of
Terry claims were litigated in the criminal context. This was in contrast to claims involving arrest warrants, of which 46 percent were criminal. Leong also showed that,
although the government is successful 90 percent of the time in Fourth Amendment
criminal cases, its success rate drops to 52 percent in civil cases. Id at 426. Importantly,
only a tiny fraction of stops are ever litigated because only a few result in an arrest, let
alone a trial. See Steven Zeidman, Whither the Criminal Court: Confronting Stops-andFrisks, 76 Albany L Rev 1187, 1187-90 (2013) (stating that it is "hardly the case" that
"New York courts are immersed in stop-and-frisk litigation" and noting that, while there
are no readily available data regarding the number of suppression hearings, they are
"few and far between" when compared to the "more than 685,000 street stops in a single
city in a single year").
82 See Rod K. Brunson, "PoliceDon't Like Black People" African-American Young
Men's Accumulated Police Experiences, 6 Crimin & Pub Pol 71, 85 (2007).
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local police8 3 Their analysis revealed that a key driver of the relationship was the youth's perception of widespread stops and
frisks. "Respondents felt that their neighborhoods had been besieged by police .... Many study participants ... characterized
their involuntary contacts with the police as demeaning and of
inordinate frequency." 84 In Gau and Brunson's sample, nearly 78
percent of respondents reported being stopped at least once in
their lives, with approximately sixteen as the mean number of
times stopped.85 Although Gau and Brunson's respondents
acknowledged the need for police to be involved in crime-control
efforts and even to detain "suspicious looking people," they could
not understand "why police would target them when they were
engaged in clearly lawful activities."86 Gau and Brunson's work

echoes additional qualitative research from New York documenting strained relationships between Latino youth and the
NYPD, fueled by harsh treatment during routine stops and
frisks without cause or explanation.87
CONCLUSION

One of the most notable features of the constitutionalization
of criminal procedure in the 1960s was the Supreme Court's focus on the realities of street policing and investigation, and the
impact of such activities on individual freedoms. Judicial decisions of that era routinely centered on empirical issues surrounding the effectiveness of police practices and their impact on
liberty interests. As the Court recognized and embraced realworld experience, it rejected the formalism of nineteenthcentury Fourth Amendment doctrine. In so doing, the Court began to describe constitutional criminal procedure rights as
guaranteeing a balance between liberty and order. In Terry, the
Court acknowledged the importance of monitoring effectiveness
by requiring "reasonable suspicion" rather than "probable cause"
to justify stop-and-frisk encounters. The reasonable suspicion
justificatory standard is itself a result of balancing liberty and

83 See Jacinta M. Gau and Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men's Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27
Just Q 255, 262 (2010).
84 Id at 266.
85 Id.
86 Id at 268.
87 See Solis, Portillos, and Brunson, 623 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 47
(cited in note 32).
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order in assessing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.88 The decision in Terry was in line with others, such as
that in Schneckloth v Bustamonte,89 in which the Court es-

chewed a requirement that an individual be told explicitly that
she has a right to refuse a search in a consensual-search context. 90 In Schneckloth, the Court actually defined the concept of
voluntariness as the accommodation of the legitimate need for
the search as against the "requirement of assuring the absence
of coercion"-a balance between liberty and order. 91
When Terry was decided, crime was on the rise, and the
Court was cognizant of the increasing demand for public safety.
It made sense for the Court to recognize the need for police officers to intervene in situations that they had carefully observed
grow organically before a crime has actually occurred. To do so is
just good police work that keeps people safe. If the briefs are evidence of the Court's thinking regarding factors on which a police officer should rely before engaging a citizen, then the factors
offered by the United States as amicus in Terry are instructive:
1. The time of day.
2. The place where the suspect is observed.
3. The incidence of crime in the immediate neighborhood.
4. The law enforcement officer's prior knowledge of the suspect.
5. The appearance of the suspect; i.e., whether he resembles
someone whom the police are seeking.
6. The pre-detention conduct of the suspect and his companions.
7. The experience of the law enforcement officer.
8. The seriousness of the suspected offense.
9. The necessity for immediate investigative activity.92

A comparison of these factors with the factors on which the
NYPD regularly relied to stop people reveals almost no overlap.
Specifically, it is clear that, while the United States recommended a set of factors that were focused on investigation of
individual offenses, the NYPD's actions, at least as presented in
Floyd, seem better characterized as "[s]weeping generalities
88 See Camara v Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 536-37 (1967) ("Unfortunately,
there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails.").
89 412 US 218 (1973).
90 Id at 227.
91 Id.
92 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Terry v Ohio, No 67, *11-12 (US
filed Nov 29, 1967) (available on Westlaw at 1967 WL 93603) (citations omitted).
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[that] ought not to be indulged in, [because] the focus should be
on the facts of the particular case." 3 The Terry Court cautioned
against the generalized practice of stopping certain individuals,
particularly members of minority groups, observing in a footnote
that stops could be a source of friction between the police and
the community, as "[m]isuse of field interrogations increases as
more police departments adopt aggressive patrol in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the
street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose
purpose for being abroad is not readily evident. 94
The Court even acknowledged, as I did above, that, in cases
of broad misuse of field interrogations, the exclusionary rule
would do little to change the practice.95 The exclusionary rule
likely works best in cases in which both the reason for the police
officer's action and his or her explanation for that action are individuated. That is one reason why the decision in Terry makes
so much sense. The case involved a police officer who was already in a neighborhood engaging in locally legitimate police
work and who saw a crime in progress and tried to stop it. Even
youths in tough urban neighborhoods recognize the need for this
kind of police work, as Gau and Brunson's interviews show. But,
as Fagan's data analyses make clear, when SQF is a program,
street officers' decisions to stop people do not grow out of investigations in situ, but rather are made exogenously, before police
actually get on the ground. The youths that Brunson and Gau
interviewed are absolutely correct that there is no legitimacy in
such stops except in the most abstract sense, because the cause
for police action and the explanation are not really about the individual that the officer has observed. Terry was about balancing the rights of police and the rights of citizens in situ, but SQF
as a program changes this equation.
A programmatic understanding of stop-and-frisk more accurately reflects reality, because stop-and-frisk generally is implemented as a program. In fact, while it is not clear whether
the justices deciding Terry appreciated this fact, there is a great
deal of evidence indicating that, at least in major cities, programmatic stop-and-frisk was regular police practice before
Terry was decided.96 Understanding stop-and-frisk as a program
93 Id at *11, citing United States v Bonanno, 180 F Supp 71, 83 (SDNY 1960).
94 Terry, 392 US at 14 n 11 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).
95 See id at 14-15.
96 See text accompanying notes 41-47.
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reveals the true costs of stop-and-frisk, because those who experience SQF-primarily young men of color-experience it as a
program and not as an individual incident. 91 Moreover, they experience the program as a group, not as individuals, because the
program is suspect driven, not incident driven.
I have argued that the Fourth Amendment ought to take
these considerations into account and that to do this, statisticsrather than stories about stops-are necessary. Today, unlike in
1968, both data and better vehicles for assessing good policing
are available. We can use the data to figure out how to enhance
public safety and to ensure that the burden of policing is distributed in a way that is not unlawful and that enhances trust
and legitimacy in policing.98 Moreover, we need not wait until
there is a constitutional violation to use the data to refine and
enhance policing along the dimensions that we care about,
which include, among others, public safety, respect for individual rights, and enhanced procedural justice. 99 Newer procedural
mechanisms, such as § 14141,100 can help to shape policing,o1
and there are policy-oriented police executives all over the country who want to get this right by imposing guidelines administratively. This is the new brief for professional policing. We can
have both safer streets and more-democratic policing.

See notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
98 I thank David Sklansky for helping me to see this point. See generally David
Alan Sklansky, The PersistentPull of Police Professionalism,Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety (National Institute of Justice, Mar 2011), archived at
https://perma.cc/WS5H-QEVL.
99 See Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference between Lawful or
Effective Policing and Rightful Policing-And Why It Matters, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev
1865, 1883-86 (2013) (calling for evaluation and reform of policing according to popular
perceptions of fairness and procedural justice in order to enhance legitimacy).
100 42 USC § 14141.
101 See generally Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights through ProactivePolic97

ing Reform, 62 Stan L Rev 1 (2009) (discussing the goals of § 14141 as a powerful tool to
reduce unconstitutional police abuse and proposing an even more efficient strategy to
use § 14141 proactively).

